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In practical problems where modeling and handling knowledge is required, information often comes piecewise from
different sources. The modeler usually wants to aggregate these pieces of information into a global model, which serves
as a basis for various kinds of inference, like decision making, estimation and many others. If the available information is
characterized by uncertainty, Bayesian theories can offer a suitable approach to problems of this kind. Yet, there are situa-
tions where the level of uncertainty characterizing the sources is so high that single probability measures cannot properly
model the available information. This goes beyond the standard Bayesian theory, and leads to alternative models of uncer-
tainty, like for example belief functions [1], and possibility measures [2]. As shown by Walley [3], these models represent
uncertainty through sets instead of single probability measures, and they can be regarded as special cases of Walley’s coher-
ent lower previsions [4]. This theory, which is usually referred to as imprecise probability, provides a very general model of
uncertain knowledge, for which some rationality criteria are also provided, these being used to identify conﬂicts among
the different sources and check whether or not the model is self-consistent. All these features seem to be particularly suited
for the aggregation of different sources of information, which can be not only uncertain and vague when considered singu-
larly, but also conﬂictual or contradictory when considered jointly.
In this paper, we apply Walley’s theory of coherent lower previsions to develop a general method of aggregation for
uncertain information coming from different sources. In order to describe this aggregation task, let us ﬁrst formulate the
problem in the Bayesian framework.
Consider n sources of information, all reporting knowledge about a variable X, whose generic value x varies in a ﬁnite set
X .1 For each j = 1, . . . ,n, the knowledge associated to the jth source is modelled by a conditional probability mass function
pj(XjAj = aj). In this formalism, the conditioning event Aj = aj describes the actual internal state of each source, which is in facty Elsevier Inc.
e letters; the corresponding calligraphic and lowercase letters denote respectively their sets of possible
y, the notation p(X) is used to denote a probability mass function over X, and p(x) to denote the probability
x 2 X .
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can be the two states of a binary variable denoting the fact that a source is reliable or not, or a collection of measurements col-
lected for the phenomenon under study.
The information associated to the different sources is collected by a single information fusion center (IFC), which aims at
aggregating this information together with its prior knowledge about X, modelled as a probability mass function p0(X). This is
achieved by identifying the sources’ beliefs about Aj given that X = x with those of the IFC, i.e., p0(ajjx): = pj(ajjx), where:Fig. 1.
comput
dashedpjðajjxÞ ¼
pjðxjajÞpjðajÞP
aj2Aj pjðxjajÞpjðajÞ
ð1Þfor each x 2 X , where pj(Aj) is the prior over the internal states of the jth source. Thus, assuming conditional independence
between variables in A1, . . . ,An given X, we can aggregate the beliefs into the following joint:p0ðx; a1; . . . ; anÞ ¼ p0ða1; . . . ; anjxÞ  p0ðxÞ ¼
Yn
j¼1
p0ðajjxÞ
" #
 p0ðxÞ ¼
Yn
j¼1
pjðxjajÞpjðajÞ
pjðxÞ
" #
 p0ðxÞ; ð2Þwith pjðxÞ ¼
P
aj2Aj pjðxjajÞpjðajÞ prior of the jth source. Finally, from (2), the aggregated posterior can be written as:p0ðxj~a1; . . . ; ~anÞ /
Yn
j¼1
pjðxj~ajÞ
pjðxÞ
" #
 p0ðxÞ; ð3Þwhere ~aj denotes the element of Aj corresponding to the observed internal state of the source. According to (3),
p0ðXj~a1; . . . ; ~anÞ is only a function of the IFC’s prior p0(X), and of the sources’ conditional pjðXj~ajÞ and prior pj(X), where the
latter two are the only pieces of information to be shared between the sources and the IFC. Note that, while the prior over
the internal states pj(Aj) is necessary to compute the conditional pj(Ajjx) from pj(Xjaj), it is not involved in (3), as we can
embed it into the normalization constant.
Fig. 1 depicts the sequential steps involved in the above derivation. The idea there is that each source should be regarded
as an independent subject, which has inferred its conditional beliefs about X given the actual internal state of the source. As
formalized in (1), each source induces amodel revision into the IFC’s beliefs. This means that, regarding the state of the source
conditional on X, the IFC identiﬁes its own beliefs with those of the source. Finally, the IFC deﬁnes a global model over all the
variables by exploiting the independence among the sources as in (2).Aggregation of the sources of information in the Bayesian framework. The black-highlighted text describes the information used by the IFC to
e the ﬁnal posterior density (still in black). The gray-highlighted text denotes the intermediate steps needed to aggregate the information. The
boxes are used to group the beliefs whose coherence will be checked in Section 4.
1016 A. Benavoli, A. Antonucci / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 51 (2010) 1014–1028In this architecture it has been assumed that each source processes its own information in order to compute the posterior
probability pj(xjaj), which can be regarded as a sufﬁcient statistical descriptor, to be shared with the IFC together with pj(x).
This is a high-level form of aggregation, since the IFC aggregates pieces of information which have already been elaborated
from the sources. This is one of the most common architectures for data fusion (see for example [5, Chapter 8]). A possible
alternative would be the case in which sources share directly the raw information, i.e., pj(ajjx), with the IFC. However, this is
just a sub-case of the general architecture in Fig. 1 (from step (b) to step (e)).
In this paper we aim at generalizing this approach to Walley’s theory of imprecise probability in the general case where,
instead of probability mass functions, the uncertainty about a variable is described by coherent lower previsions. To this end,
in Section 2 we ﬁrst recall the basics of the theory of coherent lower previsions. In Section 3, we detail the different steps of
our derivation leading to an aggregation rule for the general case of coherent lower previsions. In particular, two cases are
considered: (i) sources are assumed to be epistemically independent; (ii) no assumption is made about the independence
among the sources. For both cases, the consistency between the obtained results and the original assessment is discussed
in Section 4. In Section 5, in the case of independence, the aggregation rule is specialized for a special class of coherent lower
previsions, called linear-vacuous mixtures. In Section 6, we show how this approach can be applied in practice for a possible
explanation of Zadeh’s paradox [6]. In Section 7, we show how this approach can be used to solve an estimation fusion prob-
lem in sensor networks in the case of unknown correlation among the estimates. Conclusions and outlooks for future devel-
opments are ﬁnally reported in Section 8.2. Coherent lower previsions
Imprecise probability theory [4] is an extension of the Bayesian theory of subjective probability. The goal is to model a sub-
ject’s uncertainty by looking at his dispositions toward taking certain actions, and imposing requirements of rationality, or
consistency, on these dispositions. In order to do that, let us ﬁrst recall the fundamental notion of coherent lower prevision
(see [7] for a recent survey).
Given a variable X taking values in a set X , we use gambles, i.e., bounded functions f : X ! R, in order to express a sub-
ject’s uncertainty about X. For each x 2 X , the real number f(x) is regarded as the (possibly negative) reward, expressed in
some linear utility units that the subject receives by accepting the gamble if X = x. Uncertainty about the actual value of X
can be modelled by the willingness to accept certain gambles and to reject others. Bayesian theory assumes that subjects
are always able to provide a single fair price P(f) for f, whatever information is available about X. This assumption is relaxed
in the imprecise probability framework, where subjects can express two different prices, called respectively lower and upper
previsions and denoted by P(f) and Pðf Þ, that correspond to the highest (lowest) buying (selling) price for the gamble f. Since
selling a gamble f for a given price r is the same as buying f for the price r, the conjugacy relation Pðf Þ ¼ Pðf Þ holds and
we can therefore focus on lower previsions only. If LðXÞ denotes the set of all the bounded2 gambles on X , a lower prevision P
can be regarded as a real-valued functional on LðXÞ.
Indicator functions3 are clearly a special class of gambles. Given set X0#X , we can consider the lower prevision for the cor-
responding indicator function IX0 . The behavioural interpretation of P IX0ð Þ is the supremum rate for which the subject is disposed
to bet on the event that some x 2 X0 occurs, which is the subject’s lower probability for this event, similarly P IX0ð Þ ¼ 1 PðIXnX0 Þ is
the upper probability.
Since lower previsions represent a subject’s dispositions to act in certain ways, some criteria ensuring that these dispo-
sitions do not lead to irrational behaviours should be imposed. Coherence is the strongest requirement considered in the the-
ory of imprecise probability. A lower prevision P is coherent if and only if it satisﬁes the following properties:
(P1) minx2X f ðxÞ 6 Pðf Þ [accepting sure gains],
(P2) P(f + g)P P(f) + P(g) [super-additivity],
(P3) P(kf) = kP(f) [positive homogeneity],
for all f ; g 2 LðXÞ and non-negative real numbers k. We point the reader to [4, Chapter 2] for a deep explanation of the irra-
tional consequences of modeling beliefs by lower previsions that are not coherent. Here, we regard a coherent lower prevision
(CLP) as the more general model of a subject’s (rational) beliefs about a variable.
Let us present some examples of CLP. A linear prevision P on LðXÞ is a CLP which is also self-conjugate, i.e., P(f) = P(f) for
each f 2 LðXÞ. This property makes the prevision a linear functional, i.e., P(k(f + g)) = k P(f) + kP(g) for all f ; g 2 LðXÞ and real k.
Any linear prevision P is completely determined by its mass function p(x): = P(I{x}), since it follows from the previous prop-
erties that for any gamble f ; Pðf Þ ¼Px2XpðxÞf ðxÞ. Linear previsions correspond to the Bayesian notion of probability as in-
tended in Section 1. A CLP P on LðXÞ such that Pðf Þ ¼minx2X f ðxÞ can be easily identiﬁed as the most conservative (i.e.,
less informative) CLP and is therefore called vacuous. As both linear and vacuous previsions are coherent, we can construct
new coherent lower previsions by convex combination of the two [4, Chapter 2]. If P is a linear prevision, for each 0 6  6 1,2 Although Walley’s theory has been developed for bounded gambles only, an extension to the unbounded case can be found in [8].
3 A real-valued function on a domain is called the indicator function of a given subset of this domain if it takes the value one inside the subset and zero
otherwise.
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equivalently speciﬁed by a convex set of linear previsions, and hence by a convex set of probability distributions [4]. In this
respect, the linear-vacuous mixture model can be interpreted as the family of all convex combinations of a known nominal
distribution (i.e., the distribution associated to P(f)) with any arbitrary distribution. This family can be used to address prob-
lems in which we take into account that our model P(f) can be inexact and, thus, we perturb (contaminate) it to reﬂect this
modelling uncertainty.
Now consider also a second variable A with values in A. Given a CLP P on LðX AÞ, we can easily compute its marginal
prevision on A for each f 2 LðAÞ by noting that f can be equivalently regarded as a gamble in LðX AÞ which is constant
with respect to X, and set4 Thi
5 A mPAðf Þ :¼ Pðf Þ; ð4Þwhere the superscript A emphasizes the fact that the marginal prevision is deﬁned on LðAÞ.
For each h 2 LðX AÞ and a 2 A, a subject’s conditional lower prevision PXjA(hjA = a), denoted also as PXjA(hja), is the
highest real number r for which the subject would buy the gamble h for any price strictly lower than r, if he knew in addi-
tion that the variable A assumes the value a. We denote by PXjA(hjA) the gamble on A that assumes the value PXjA(hjA = a)
for each a 2 A. Overall, PXjA(hjA) is a gamble on A for each h 2 LðX AÞ and PXjA(jA) is a map between LðX AÞ and LðAÞ.
A conditional lower prevision PXjA(jA) is said to be separately coherent if PXjA(ja) is a CLP on LðX AÞ and PXjAðIXfagjaÞ ¼ 1,
for each a 2 A. The last condition means that if the subject knew that A = a, he would be disposed to bet at all non-trivial odds
on the event that A = a.
If, besides the separately coherent conditional lower prevision PXjA(jA) on LðX AÞ, the subject has also speciﬁed an
unconditional CLP P on LðX AÞ, then P and PXjA(jA) should in addition satisfy the criterion of joint coherence, that requiresP IXfag h PXjAðhjaÞ
   ¼ 0 ð5Þfor each a 2 A and h 2 LðX AÞ. It can be proved [4, Chapter 6] that, if PðIXfagÞ > 0, PXjA(hja) is the only solution of (5). Thus,
given a joint CLP on LðX AÞ, a (separately coherent) conditional lower prevision can be obtained from (5). For this reason,
this equation is also called generalized Bayes rule (GBR). The solution of (5) is not unique if PðIXfagÞ ¼ 0. Nevertheless, if
PðIXfagÞ > 0, a unique conditional prevision PXjA(ja) can be computed by the following regular extension [4, Appendix J]:PXjAðhjaÞ ¼maxfl : PðIXfag½h lÞP 0g: ð6ÞFinally, if also PðIXfagÞ ¼ 0, the only coherent extension of PXjA(ja) is the vacuous one.
On the other side, given a (separately coherent) conditional lower prevision PXjA(jA) and a coherent marginal prevision PA
on A, a joint CLP on LðX AÞ can be obtained by marginal extension:PðhÞ ¼ PAðPXjAðhjAÞÞ: ð7ÞThe marginal extension P in (7) can be proved to be jointly coherent with PXjA as in (5), and its marginal on A is still PA [4,
Chapter 6].
The standard notion of conditional independence considered in the Bayesian theory requires a more general formulation
in the framework of CLPs. Given a joint CLP P on LðX Ai AjÞ, we say that, according to P,Aj is epistemically irrelevant to Ai
given X, if:PAi jX;Aj ðhjx; ajÞ ¼ PAi jXðhjxÞ ð8Þ
for each h 2 LðAiÞ; x 2 X and aj 2 Aj, where both PAi jX;Aj and PAi jX are obtained from P through GBR. If Aj is epistemically irrel-
evant to Ai given X, and Ai is epistemically irrelevant to Aj given X, then Ai and Aj are said to be epistemically independent
(given X).
Let us adopt, for sake of compactness, the notation An: = (A1, . . . ,An) and An :¼ nj¼1Aj.
Given a collection of separately coherent conditional lower previsions PAj jXj on LðAjÞ, for each j = 1, . . . ,n, the most conser-
vative separately coherent conditional lower prevision PA
n jX which is coherent with each PAj jXj , is deﬁned as follows:PðgjxÞ ¼ sup
gj2LðAjÞ
j¼1;...;n
inf
aj2Aj
j¼1;...;n
gða1; . . . ; anÞ 
Xn
j¼1
½gjðajÞ  PjðgjjxÞ
( )
: ð9ÞThis is the natural extension [4]. Under the further assumption that, for each i, j = 1, . . . ,n with i– j,Ai and Aj are epistemically
independent given X, a more informative CLP might be obtained. This is the independent natural extension [9],4 which is
deﬁned as follows5:s paper includes a survey of different aggregation rules for CLPs. Our approach differs as we aggregate knowledge referred to a same domain.
ore general formula for non-linear spaces can be found in [10].
6 We
require
7 Not
8 The
based o
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gj2LðAjÞ
j¼1;...;n
inf
aj2Aj
j¼1;...;n
gða1; . . . ; anÞ 
Xn
j¼1
gjða1; . . . ; anÞ  Pjðgjða1; . . . ; aj1; ; ajþ1 . . . ; anÞjxÞ
 ( )
: ð10ÞThe notion of joint coherence between a separately coherent conditional lower prevision and a joint CLP in (5) reﬂects the
fact that our assessments should be consistent not only separately, but also with each other. GBR provides the deﬁnition of
joint coherence for the simplest collection of (conditional) lower previsions, i.e., an unconditional and a conditional CLP. In
the case of a larger collection of separately coherent conditional lower previsions, joint coherence can be characterized by
the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The separately coherent conditional lower previsions PAj jXj , with j = 1, . . . ,n, are jointly coherent if there is a CLP P on
LðX  AnÞ such that: (i) its marginal PX assigns positive probability to the elements of X ; (ii) its marginals PAj;X are jointly coherent
with PXjAjj , for each j = 1, . . . ,n, in the sense of (5).
The proof of this theorem can be found in [11, Theorem 5]. A more general formulation based on the concept of regular
extension can be found in [12, Theorem 3].
3. Aggregating coherent lower previsions
The theoretical results reviewed in Section 2 can be employed for a generalization to imprecise probabilities of the aggre-
gation rule presented in Section 1. Accordingly, we suppose that the jth source of information, for each j = 1, . . . ,n, makes
assessments about the value that X assumes in X conditionally on its internal states ~aj 2 Aj. Such assessments are expressed
through separately coherent conditional lower previsions PXjAjj . Furthermore, also extra assessments about the internal states
of the sources are available and again expressed in terms of CLPs PAjj on LðAjÞ for j = 1, . . . ,n. The IFC should therefore gather
this information and aggregate it with its prior about X, which is expressed as a CLP PX0 on LðXÞ.
Our goal is to compute the IFC’s joint CLP P0 on LðX AnÞ from which the beliefs about X conditional on the actual inter-
nal states of the sources ð~a1; . . . ; ~anÞ could be computed. By analogy with the derivation in Section 1, this task is achieved by
the following sequential steps:
(a) As outlined in (7), a CLP Pj on LðX AjÞ can be derived from PXjAjj and P
Aj
j by marginal extensionPjðfjÞ :¼ PAjj P
XjAj
j ðfjjAjÞ
 
ð11Þfor each fj 2 LðX AjÞ and j = 1, . . . ,n.
(b) GBR as in (5) is used to compute, given Pj, the conditional CLP P
Aj jX
j on LðX AjÞ.6 Accordingly, by computing the solu-
tion l of the equationPjðIf~xg  ½fj  lÞ ¼ 0; ð12Þ
we have PAj jXj ðfjj~xÞ :¼ l, for each fj 2 LðAjÞ; ~x 2 X , and j = 1, . . . ,n. The so-obtained separately coherent conditional lower pre-
visions associated to the sources are assumed to induce a model revision into the corresponding beliefs of the IFC, i.e.,P
Aj jX
0 ðfjjxÞ :¼ P
Aj jX
j ðfjjxÞ ð13Þfor each fj 2 LðAjÞ and x 2 X .
(c) If the sources are epistemically irrelevant each other given X = x, a conditional CLP PA
n jX
0 can be obtained from P
An jX
0 by
means of independent natural extension (10). If the irrelevance assumption cannot be met, the natural extension (9)
can be used instead. Due to its generality, i.e., no assumption about the independence among the sources is made,
natural extension may produce very conservative (i.e., uninformative) results. When the irrelevance among the
sources cannot be guaranteed, in order to obtain more informative results, the conditional CLP PA
n jX
0 can be deﬁned
in the following way:PA
n jX
0 :¼ ð1 cÞPA
n jX
INE þ cPA
n jX
NE ; ð14Þ
with 0 6 c 6 1. This is the contamination of the CLP PA
n jX
INE , obtained by independent natural extension, with the CLP P
An jX
NE , ob-
tained by natural extension.7 The CLP (14) can be used to address cases in which we take into account that the independence
assumption can be wrong and, thus, we perturb PA
n jX
INE with P
An jX
NE .
8 This approach can be easily proved to preserve coherence (see
Section 4), while the same cannot be guaranteed for contamination of PA
n jX
INE with arbitrary CLPs (e.g., vacuous ones).noted that GBR requires PXj ðIf~xgÞ > 0. If only PXj ðIf~xgÞ > 0 holds, regular extension (6) should be employed instead. An example of the calculations
d in this latter case is in Section 6. Finally, if also PXj ðIf~xgÞ ¼ 0, the only coherent extension of P
Aj jX
j is the vacuous one.
e that the contamination is between CLPs over the same domain.
design parameter c is used to weight the possibility that the assumption of epistemic independence could be inexact. The choice of the value of c is
n a trade-off between robustness of the model (large c) and precision (informativeness) of the inferences (small c).
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coheren
10 WeP0ðgÞ :¼ PX0 PA
n jX
0 ðgjXÞ
 
ð15Þfor each g 2 LðX AnÞ.
(e) Finally, assuming that PA
n
0 ð~a1; . . . ; ~anÞ > 0, where ð~a1; . . . ; ~anÞ 2 An are the observed internal states of the sources, we
again apply GBR,P0 If~a1 ;...;~ang  g  l½ 
  ¼ 0; ð16Þto compute the separately coherent conditional lower prevision PXjA
n
0 ðjAnÞ on LðXÞ.9
The above derivation has been achieved by analogy with that in Section 1, but in the more general framework of CLPs.
This allows for a more robust modelling of the information reported by the sources, under weaker assumptions about their
independence (see (9) or (14)). Notice also that, if the sources directly provide the CLPs PAj jXj , we could still apply our proce-
dure by considering only the steps from (c) to (e). In the case of epistemic independence among the sources, the posterior
CLP coincides in this case with that returned by a naive credal classiﬁer (e.g., compare Table 2 with the results in [13]). This
holds in spite of a different notion of independence (strong independence is assumed in [13]). The same results can be also
obtained by means of the algorithm in [14].
Notice that, steps from (c) to (e) hold also if X is a continuous variable, this producing in general a non-vacuous condi-
tional PXjA
n
0 ðjAnÞ. Conversely, step (b) for X continuous would produce a vacuous conditional, being in general
PXj ðIf~xgÞ ¼ PXj ðIf~xgÞ ¼ 0. Therefore, if the sources directly provide the CLPs P
Aj jX
j , we can apply our aggregation framework also
for continuous X. An example of this kind of application is in Section 7, while in the rest of the paper we always assume both
X and Aj, j = 1, . . . ,n, discrete.
The coherence between the joint CLP obtained at the step (d) and the initial assessments will be investigated in the next
section.
4. Checking coherence
The subjects involved in the derivation formalized in the previous section (i.e., the sources and the IFC) should be re-
garded as autonomous and distinct individuals. Nevertheless, we have assumed that the uncertain information associated
to a subject can induce in another subject a model revision, i.e., the second agent can replace his own CLPs (even in the con-
ditional case) with those of the ﬁrst agent. More speciﬁcally, in our architecture, we allow for an asymmetrical model revi-
sion, as we assume that each source revises the IFC’s beliefs as in (1) or in (13), while the contrary cannot take place because
of the way the sources and the IFC share the information (no feedback allowed). In this section we discuss the coherence
between the different beliefs speciﬁed in our model. According to the previous argument, this will be done separately for
each subject, by considering also the beliefs induced by other subjects via model revision.
Let us start from the coherence of the IFC’s beliefs. In order to do that, we ﬁrst consider the derivation in the precise case
as in Section 1. As outlined in Fig. 1, the mass functions to be considered are the conditionals p0(Ajjx), for each j = 1, . . . ,n,
which are obtained through model revision from the sources, and the marginal p0(X). The consistency between these assess-
ments when considered jointly follows from the existence of a joint probability mass function, which is clearly the one in (2),
from which these mass functions can be obtained. Concerning the IFC, we should also verify that this joint probability mass
function preserves the assumption of independence between the sources given X. This holds since, after marginalization and
Bayes rule, the joint probability mass function p0 in (2) is such that p0(aijx,aj) = p0(aijx) for each i, j = 1, . . . ,n, ai 2 Ai; aj 2 Aj
and x 2 X . Analogous results, in the more general framework of imprecise probability, can be obtained by considering the
joint CLP P0 in (15), which is the basis to prove the following result.
Theorem 2. The separately coherent conditional lower previsions PAj jX0 in (13) and P
X
0 are jointly coherent.Proof. The joint coherence of the assessments PX0 and P
Aj jX
j ðjxÞ, considered for each j = 1, . . . ,n, can be proved by considering
the joint CLP PX;A
n
0 in (15). As a consequence of marginal extension, P
X;An
0 is jointly coherent with both P
X
0 and P
An jX
0 ðjxÞ. For
each fj 2 LðAjÞ and x 2 X , Eq. (14) states that10:PA
n jX
0 ðfjjxÞ ¼ ð1 cÞPA
n jX
INE ðfjjxÞ þ cPA
n jX
NE ðfjjxÞ: ð17Þ
But PA
n jX
INE ðfjjxÞ ¼ P
Aj jX
0 ðfjjxÞ because of deﬁnition of independent natural extension and similarly PA
n jX
NE ðfjjxÞ ¼ P
Aj jX
0 ðfjjxÞ because
of deﬁnition of natural extension. Thus, for each fj 2 LðAjÞ and x 2 X , PA
n jX
0 ðfjjxÞ ¼ P
Aj jX
0 ðfjjxÞ, i.e., PA
n jX
0 and P
Aj jX
0 are jointly coher-
ent for each i = 1, . . . ,n.e that, also in this case, if we only have that PA
n
0 ð~a1; . . . ; ~anÞ > 0, the regular extension (6) can be used instead. Again, if also PA
n
0 ð~a1; . . . ; ~anÞ ¼ 0, the only
t extension of PXjA
n
0 ðjAnÞ is the vacuous one.
proceed as in (4) in order to regard a gamble over a single variable as a gamble in a joint domain.
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n
j ðIfa1 ;...;angÞ > 0 PXjA
n ðja1; . . . ; anÞ can be obtained by GBR and its coherence follows from Theorem 1. On the
other side, if PA
n
j ðIfa1 ;...;angÞ ¼ 0, but PA
n
j ðIfa1 ;...;angÞ > 0, PXjA
n
j ðja1; . . . ; anÞ can be obtained by regular extension, and its coherence
follows from [12, Theorem 3], where it is proved that PX0 and P
An jX are jointly coherent with their so-called strong product. This
result applies to our case because the joint PA
n ;X
0 , as deﬁned in (15) can be easily veriﬁed to be the strong product of P0 and
PA
n jX . This proof holds also if X is a continuous variable, see [15, Appendix]. h
On the other side, checking the coherence of the beliefs associated to a particular source is trivial, as PXjAjj and P
Aj
j are
jointly coherent because of (5), for each j = 1, . . . ,n. We have argued that the IFC’s beliefs are not required to be coherent with
those of the sources, as they refer to separate subjects. Nevertheless, let us consider what can be said about the consistency
between different subjects in the Bayesian (i.e., precise) formulation. By exploiting the independence between the sources,
(2) rewrites as:11 Thep0ðx; a1; . . . ; anÞ ¼
Yn
j¼1
p0ðxjajÞp0ðajÞ
p0ðxÞ
p0ðxÞ: ð18ÞBy comparing (18) with (2), it can be noticed that the joint coherence between the IFC’s beliefs and those of the jth source
cannot be guaranteed in general. In fact, we can always impose p0(xjaj): = pj(xjaj) and p0(aj): = pj(aj), but, at least in general,
it is not possible to have at the same time p0(X) = pj(X), for each j = 1, . . . ,n. In fact, since each source and the IFC are con-
sidered as autonomous subjects and the information ﬂows from the sources to the IFC, we cannot require that the sources
agree on their marginals over X , i.e., pi(X) = pj(X) for each i, j = 1, . . . ,n. Thus, the IFC can deﬁne a single global probabilistic
model over all the variables that reproduces all the inputs from the sources only if the IFC and all the sources share the
same prior over X.5. Mathematical derivation for linear-vacuous mixtures under epistemic independence
Let us detail the derivation described in Section 3 for the special case of epistemic independence among the sources given
Xwhen the marginal associated to the IFC and the separately coherent conditional lower previsions speciﬁed for the sources
are linear-vacuous mixtures, while the marginals over Aj are linear.11 This corresponds to the following settings:PX0ðhÞ :¼ 0
X
x2X
p0ðxÞhðxÞ þ ð1 0Þminx2X hðxÞ;
P
XjAj
j ðfjjajÞ :¼ 
aj
j
X
x2X
pjðxjajÞfjðx; ajÞ þ ð1 ajj Þminx2X f jðx; ajÞ; 8aj 2 Aj ð19Þ
P
Aj
j ðgjÞ :¼
X
aj2Aj
pjðajÞgjðajÞ; ð20Þwhere pj(Xjaj),pj(Aj) and p0(X) are probability mass functions, fj 2 LðX AjÞ; gj 2 LðAjÞ, and h 2 LðXÞ, for all j = 1, . . . ,n. The
derivation is as follows.
(a) In this particular case, (11) rewrites asPjðfjÞ ¼
X
aj2Aj
pjðajÞ  ajj
X
x2X
pjðxjajÞ  fjðx; ajÞ þ 1 ajj
 
min
x2X
fjðx; ajÞ
 !
ð21Þfor each fj 2 LðX AjÞ and j = 1, . . . ,n.
(b) Thus, for each ~x 2 X , (12) becomes:X
aj2Aj
pjðajÞ  ajj ½fjð~x; ajÞ  lpjð~xjajÞ þ ð1 
aj
j Þminf0; fjð~x; ajÞ  lg
 
¼ 0: ð22ÞDeﬁne the subset Aj ðlÞ of Aj as follows:Aj ðlÞ :¼ faj 2 Aj : f jð~x; ajÞ  l < 0g; ð23Þwhere fj, ~x are omitted from the arguments of Aj for sake of simpler notation. Eq. (22) rewrites as:X
aj2Aj
pjðajÞ ajj pjð~xjajÞ þ 1 
aj
j
 
IAj ðlÞðajÞ
h i
fjð~x; ajÞ  l
X
aj2Aj
pjðajÞ ajj pjð~xjajÞ þ ð1 
aj
j ÞIAj ðlÞðajÞ
h i
¼ 0: ð24Þlast assumption will be relaxed at the end of this section.
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solves (22), without explicitly solving this equation. Accordingly, we set Aj :¼ Aj ð~lÞ, and the solution P
Aj jX
j ðfjj~xÞ of (24) is12:12 Thi
13 Set
14 Not
employP
aj2Aj pjðajÞ 
aj
j pjð~xjajÞ þ ð1 
aj
j ÞIAj ðajÞ
h i
fjð~x; ajÞP
aj2Aj pjðajÞ 
aj
j pjð~xjajÞ þ 1 
aj
j
 
IAj ðajÞ
h i : ð25Þ
(c) The (separately coherent) conditional lower previsions associated to the sources and deﬁned as in (25) induce the fol-
lowing model revision into the IFC’s beliefs,P
Aj jX
0 ðfjjxÞ :¼ P
Aj jX
j ðfjjxÞ ð26Þfor each fj 2 LðAjÞ; j ¼ 1; . . . ;n and x 2 X . As a consequence of the epistemic irrelevance assumption for the sources given X,
the independent natural extension to An should be considered. According to (10), we have:PA
n jX
0 ðgj~xÞ ¼ sup
gj2LðXAj Þ
j¼1;...;n
inf
aj2Aj
j¼1;...;n
gð~x; a1; . . . ; anÞ 
Xn
j¼1
gjð~x; a1; . . . ; anÞ  PAj jX0 ðgjð~x; a1; . . . ; aj1; ; ajþ1 . . . ; anÞj~xÞ
h i( )
ð27Þfor each ~x 2 X . Notice that the gamble gjð~x; a1; . . . ; aj1; ; ajþ1 . . . ; anÞ is in LðX AjÞ. Let us consider, in (27), only gambles
g 2 LðX AnÞ such that, for X ¼ ~x and each ða1; . . . ; anÞ 2 An, factorize as follows:gð~x; a1; . . . ; anÞ ¼
Yn
j¼1
g0jð~x; ajÞ; ð28Þwith g0j 2 LðX AjÞ for each j = 1, . . . ,n. Assume also that the gamble g0jð~x; Þ 2 LðAjÞ has a constant sign in Aj, and denote its
sign by rj ¼ rjð~xÞ.13 Under these assumptions, if we intend, for ﬁxed ~x, g as a gamble on An, we have that g has constant sign
and (27) reduces to:PA
n jX
0 ðgj~xÞ ¼
Qn
j¼1P
Aj jX
0 ðg0jj~xÞ if g P 0
Qnj¼1PAj jX0 ðrjg0jj~xÞ if g < 0
8<
: ; ð29Þwhere g0j is the above deﬁned gj, for each j = 1, . . . ,n. The proof is in [10, Section 5]. The gambles we consider in the following
factorize as in (28), and we can therefore use (29) instead of (27).
(d) By marginal extension (15), the following joint CLP can be calculated:P0ðhÞ ¼ PX0 PA
n jX
0 ðhjxÞ
 
¼ 0
X
x2X
PA
n jX
0 ðhjxÞp0ðxÞ þ ð1 0Þminx2X P
An jX
0 ðhjxÞ: ð30Þ(e) Thus, by GBR, given f~a1; . . . ; ~ang 2 An, the conditional CLP PXjA
n
0 ðgj~a1; . . . ; ~anÞ is the solution of:
P0ðIf~a1gf~angðg  lÞÞ ¼ 0; ð31Þwhere we assume P0ðIf~a1gf~angÞ > 0. Note also that the only values of the gamble g that should be considered for the solution
of (31) are those such that An–~an, because otherwise the argument of P0 is zero. Furthermore, for ﬁxed x, gðx; ~a1; . . . ; ~anÞ  l is
constant. Thus, the gamble factorizes as in (28), with g0ið~x; aiÞ ¼ If~aig, for each i < n and g0ið~x; anÞ ¼ If~angðgðÞ  lÞ. Therefore, no-
tice that ri = 1, for each i < n and rn = sgn (g()  l). Thus, (29) holds and we can write14:PA
n jXðhjxÞ ¼ PA1 jX1 ðIf~a1gjxÞ    PAn jXn ðIf~angjxÞ½gðx; ~a1; . . . ; ~anÞ  lIfgðx;~a1 ;...;~anÞlP0g þ PA1 jX1 ðIf~a1gjxÞ    PAn jXn ðIf~angjxÞ
 ½gðx; ~a1; . . . ; ~anÞ  lIfgðx;~a1 ;...;~anÞl<0g: ð32Þ
According to (32), (31) can be written as in Table 1, where from (25) it can be derived that:P
Aj jX
j ðIf~ajgj~xÞ ¼
pjð~ajÞ
~aj
j pjðxj~ajÞP
aj2Aj pjðajÞ 
aj
j pjðxjajÞ þ ð1 
aj
j ÞIAjnf~ajgðajÞ
h i : ð33Þ
It can be easily veriﬁed that Aj ¼ Aj n f~ajg in this case. Again from (25):P
Aj jX
j IfAjn~ajgjx
 
¼
P
aj2Aj ;aj–~ajpjðaiÞ
aj
j pjðxjajÞP
aj2Aj pjðajÞ 
aj
j pjðxjajÞ þ ð1 
aj
j ÞIf~ajgðajÞ
h i ; ð34Þs is possible if PjðIf~xgAj Þ ¼
P
aj2Aj pjðajÞ
aj
j pjð~xjajÞ > 0.
rj = +1 if g0jð~x; Þ > 0, rj = 1 if g0jð~x; Þ < 0 and rj = 0 otherwise.
e that the indicator functions in (32) refer to sets that are implicitly deﬁned through inequalities over gambles. This kind of speciﬁcation will be
ed also in the followings.
Table 1
The unique solution l of GBR corresponding to the conditional CLP PXjA
n
0 ðgj~a1; . . . ; ~anÞ.
0 ¼ 0
X
x2X
PA1 jX0 ðIf~a1gjxÞ    PAn jX0 ðIf~angjxÞIfgðx;~a1 ;...;~anÞlP0g þ PA1 jX0 ðIf~a1gjxÞ   PAn jX0 ðIf~angjxÞIfgðx;~a1 ;...;~an Þl<0g
h i
ðgðx; ~a1; . . . ; ~anÞ  lÞp0ðxÞ
n o
þ ð1 0Þmin
x2X
PA1 jX0 ðIf~a1gjxÞ    PAn jX0 ðIf~angjxÞIfgðx;~a1 ;...;~an ÞlP0g þ PA1 jX0 ðIf~a1gjxÞ    PAn jX0 ðIf~angjxÞIfgðx;~a1 ;...;~an Þl<0g
h i
ðgðx; ~a1; . . . ; ~anÞ  lÞ
n o
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is one minus the lower probability in (34), and hence:15 WeP
Aj jX
j If~ajgjx
 
¼
pjð~ajÞ 
~aj
j pjðxj~ajÞ þ ð1 
~aj
j Þ
h i
P
aj2Aj pjðaiÞ 
aj
j pjðxjajÞ þ ð1 
aj
j ÞIf~ajgðajÞ
h i : ð35Þ
Finally, by solving the equation in Table 1 with respect to l, the conditional CLPs PXjA
n
0 ðgj~a1; . . . ; ~anÞ can be calculated for each
f~a1; . . . ; ~ang 2 An.
The assumption of linearity for the prior beliefs over the sources can be relaxed to the case where the previsions PAjj are
CLPs generated by the lower envelope of a ﬁnite set of linear previsions [4, Chapter 3]. In this case, we solve the equation in
Table 1 for each element of this set, and the minimum over these values is the solution in the general case. The following
results can be easily veriﬁed to follow from our derivation.
1. If PX0 is vacuous (i.e., 0 = 0), then also P
XjAn
0 is vacuous. This is consistent with the results in [16].
2. If PXjAjj is vacuous (i.e., 
~aj
j ¼ 0) for each j = 1, . . . ,n, then PjðIf~xgAj Þ ¼ 0 and, (22) cannot be solved by (25). In this case, from
(22) it is straightforward to verify that PAj jXj ðfjj~xÞ is vacuous (if pj(ai) > 0 for each i), that PA
n jXðgj~xÞ is also vacuous and that
PXjA
n
0 ðgj~a1; . . . ; ~anÞ is equal to PX0ðgÞ.
3. In order to derive an analytical derivation for PXjA
n
0 ðgj~a1; . . . ; ~anÞ, in (24) and (31) we have assumed non-zero lower prob-
ability for the conditioning events. However, if this is not the case, but the upper probability of the conditioning events is
positive, we can apply regular extension to compute a non-vacuous conditional CLP PXjA
n
0 ðgj~a1; . . . ; ~anÞ. However, for this
case, a general analytical expression of PXjA
n
0 ðgj~a1; . . . ; ~anÞ cannot be derived, but the posterior CLP can be computed
numerically.
4. In (3), it is shown that, since the posterior p0(xja1, . . . ,an) does not depend on p(aj), the only pieces of information to be
shared between sources and IFC are pj(x) and pj(xjaj). In the imprecise case, additional information must be shared
between sources and IFC. In fact, from Table 1 and from (33) and (35), it can be seen that PXjA
n
0 ðgj~a1; . . . ; ~anÞ depends on
the sources’ priors PXj , on the conditional P
XjAj
j and on ð1 
~aj
j Þpð~ajÞ. In fact, that the denominator in (33) is just equal
to PXj ðIfxgÞ  1 
~aj
j
 
pð~ajÞ ¼ PXj ðIXnfxgÞ  1 
~aj
j
 
pð~ajÞ, while the denominator in (35) is PXj ðIfxgÞ þ ð1 
~aj
j Þpð~ajÞ. Con-
versely, the dependency on pð~ajÞ in the numerators of (33) and (35) is dropped in Table 1, since the sum and the minimum
are over x and, thus pð~ajÞ can be simpliﬁed. Summarizing, the pieces of information to be shared between sources and IFC
are:the conditionalPXjAjj , the marginal CLP P
X
j , which corresponds to the prior CLP of the sources and the quantity
1 ~ajj
 
pð~ajÞ, which is equal to the probability that the jth source is in the state pð~ajÞ multiplied by the degree of impre-
cision P
XjAj
j ðIfxgÞ  P
XjAj
j ðIfxgÞ ¼ 1 
~aj
j .
6. Zadeh’s Paradox
The problem of aggregating beliefs over the same variable and under the assumption of independence has been already
considered in other uncertainty theories. In the case of Dempster–Shafer (DS) theory [1], Dempster’s combination rule allows
for the following aggregation of two mass functions m1 and m215:m12ðXÞ /
X
X1 ;X2 :X1\X2¼X
m1ðX1Þ m2ðX2Þ: ð36ÞYet, in the 1980s, DS theory suffered a serious blow when Zadeh proposed his ‘‘paradox”, an example for which the Demp-
ster’s rule of combination gives an apparently counter-intuitive result [6].point to [1] for details about DS theory.
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cussion (x2) or brain tumor (x3). Thus, X ¼ fx1; x2; x3g is the state space (frame of discernment) of the variable of interest X.
The doctors agree in considering a tumor quite unlikely, but they disagree in deciding the likely cause, thus providing the
following diagnosis:Doctor 1! m1ðx1Þ ¼ 0:99; m1ðx3Þ ¼ 0:01;
Doctor 2! m2ðx2Þ ¼ 0:99; m2ðx3Þ ¼ 0:01;
ð37Þwhile the basic belief masses of the other elements of the power set of X are null. From (36) one gets
m12ðx1Þ ¼ 0; m12ðx2Þ ¼ 0; m12ðx3Þ ¼ 1: ð38ÞHence, from direct application of the DS theory, it turns out that the patient certainly suffers from brain tumor. This result
arises from the fact that the two doctors agree that the patient most likely does not suffer from tumor but are in almost full
contradiction for the other causes of the disease. Since doctors’ diagnoses are modelled by precise probability mass func-
tions, also Bayesian approaches like the one in Section 1 might be applied to Zadeh’s example; yet the same result is
obtained.
Haenni has shown that the controversy of Zadeh’s example can be overcome by assuming that the doctors are not fully
reliable [17]. To take this into account, one has to build a model that includes two more variables, modelling the reliabilities
of the doctors. Let A1 = a1 correspond to the statement ‘‘Doctor 1 is reliable”, and A1 ¼ :a1 to ‘‘Doctor 1 is unreliable”; then
p1(a1) can be interpreted as the probability that the ﬁrst source is reliable, and p1ð:a1Þ ¼ 1 p1ða1Þ that it is not reliable, and
similarly for Doctor 2. By following this idea, our aggregation framework can be applied to Zadeh’s example. The doctors’
diagnoses (37) can be formalized as in (19) by setting a11 ¼ 1; p1ðx1ja1Þ ¼ 0:99; p1ðx2ja1Þ ¼ 0; p1ðx3ja1Þ ¼ 0:01 and :a11 ¼ 0
for Doctor 1, and similarly but with p2(x1ja2) = 0 and p2(x2ja2) = 0.99 for Doctor 2. Notice that, by setting :a11 ¼ :a22 ¼ 0, it
has been assumed that PXj:a11 and P
Xj:a2
1 are vacuous, i.e., if the doctors are unreliable they do not provide any useful infor-
mation. Furthermore, let us assume p1(a1) = p2(a2) = d with d 2 (0,1) and 0 = 1, p0(x1) = p0(x2) = p0(x3) = 1/3. Under the
assumption of independence, the goal is to evaluate the posterior belief PXjA1 ;A20 ðIf~xgj~a1; ~a2Þ, which represents the lower prob-
ability of the diagnosis ~x 2 X conditional on the fact that the sources are in a particular state ð~a1; ~a2Þ. In this case, we can
compute the lower probability PXjA1 ;A20 ðIf~xgj~a1; ~a2Þ by simply putting gðx; ~a1; ~a2Þ ¼ If~xg in the equation in Table 1. The resulting
conditional probabilities are shown in Table 2. For Doctor 1, the CLPs PAj jX1 for X = x1 or X = x3 can be derived from (34) and
(35). Conversely, for X = x2, since P1ðIfx2gA1 Þ ¼ 0, the GBR cannot be applied to get P
Aj jx2
1 and, thus, (34) and (35) are not valid
anymore. However, sinceP1ðIfx2gA1 Þ ¼
X
~aj2A1
p1ð~ajÞ  
~aj
j
X
x2X
p1ðxj~ajÞIfx2gA1 ðx; ~ajÞ þ 1 
~aj
j
 
max
x2X
Ifx2gA1 ðx; ~ajÞ
 !
¼ p1ð:a1Þ > 0;the regular extension (6) can be used to deriveP
Aj jx2
1 ðgjx2Þ ¼ maxl PðIfx2gA1 ½g  lÞP 0;where the gambles we are interested in are only Ifa1g and If:a1g. From (24), P
Aj jx2
1 ðgjx2Þ can be calculated by ﬁnding the max-
imum value of l for whichX
~aj2A1
pjð~ajÞ 
~aj
j pjðx2j~ajÞ þ 1 
~aj
j
 
IA1ðlÞð~ajÞ
h i
gð~ajÞ  l
X
~aj2A1
pjð~ajÞ 
~aj
j pjðx2j~ajÞ þ 1 
~aj
j
 
IA1ðlÞð~ajÞ
h i
P 0: ð39ÞThe values of l which satisfy (39) in the cases g ¼ Ifa1g and g ¼ If:a1g are l = 0 and, respectively, l = 1. Hence, it follows that
P
Aj jx2
1 ðIfa1gjx2Þ ¼ P
Aj jx2
1 ðIfa1gjx2Þ ¼ 0 and P
Aj jx2
1 ðIf:a1gjx2Þ ¼ P
Aj jx2
1 ðIf:a1gjx2Þ ¼ 1. A similar derivation can be clearly achieved for Doc-
tor 2. Posterior lower and upper probabilities calculated for the reliability value d = 0.8 are shown in Table 3. The values of
the conditionals which depend on d are highlighted in bold-face. It can be noticed that, in the case the sources are in the
states ~a1 ¼ a1 and ~a2 ¼ a2, i.e., both sources are reliable, one gets the following precise conditional probability
PXjA1 ;A20 ðIfx1gja1; a2Þ ¼ PXjA1 ;A20 ðIfx1gja1; a2Þ ¼ 0, PXjA1 ;A20 ðIfx2gja1; a2Þ ¼ PXjA1 ;A20 ðIfx2gja1; a2Þ ¼ 0, and PXjA1 ;A20 ðIfx3gja1; a2Þ ¼ PXjA1 ;A20 ðIfx3gj
a1; a2Þ ¼ 1. This result holds for each value of d and shows that, when both the sources are reliable, the answer provided
in (38) by both DS and Bayesian theory is coherent with the initial assessments. In fact, since Doctor 1 says implicitly that
x2 is wrong (with almost absolute certainty), and Doctor 2 says that x1 is wrong, it follows then that x3 must be the true diag-
nosis when both doctors are reliable.
According to Table 3 it can also be noticed that when both doctors are unreliable the conditionals are vacuous for all the
diseases. Conversely, if only one doctor is reliable, e.g., Doctor 1 in Table 3, the disease that he believes wrong has precisely
zero probability. For d > 0.9, it can be veriﬁed that PXjA1 ;A20 ðIfx1gja1;:a2Þ > PXjA1 ;A20 ðIfx3gja1;:a2Þ and, thus, the lower probability
of x1 dominates the upper probability of the other element. In this case, the IFC can decide, without a doubt, that the patient
suffers from disease x1.
In general, in this kind of problems, the sources of information do not provide their reliability status (i.e., f~a1; ~a2g). How-
ever, since the doctors’ diagnoses are almost in full contradiction, the IFC can infer that at least one of the doctors must be
unreliable and, thus, apply the aggregation rule by computing the following lower conditional probability
Table 2
Upper and lower conditional probability for the Zadeh’s example for i; j; k ¼ 1;2; 3 and i–j–k.
PXjA1 ;A20 ðIfxigj~a1; ~a2Þ ¼
P
A1 jX
1 ðIf~a1 g jxiÞP
A2 jX
2 ðIf~a2 g jxiÞ
P
A1 jX
1 ðIf~a1 g jxiÞP
A2 jX
2 ðIf~a2 g jxiÞþP
A1 jX
1 ðIf~a1g jxjÞP
A2 jX
2 ðIf~a2 g jxjÞþP
A1 jX
1 ðIf~a1 g jxkÞP
A2 jX
2 ðIf~a2 g jxkÞ
PXjA1 ;A20 ðIfxigj~a1; ~a2Þ ¼
P
A1 jX
a ðIf~a1 g jxiÞP
A2 jX
2 ðIf~a2 g jxiÞ
P
A1 jX
1 ðIf~a1 g jxiÞP
A2 jX
2 ðIf~a2 g jxiÞþP
A1 jX
1 ðIf~a1g jxjÞP
A2 jX
2 ðIf~a2 g jxjÞþP
A1 jX
1 ðIf~a1 g jxkÞP
A2 jX
2 ðIf~a2 g jxkÞ
Table 3
Posterior lower and upper probabilities in the case d = 0.8. The values of the conditionals which depend on d are highlighted in bold-face.
PXjA1 ;A20 ðja1; a2Þ PXjA1 ;A20 ðja1; a2Þ PXjA1 ;A20 ðja1;:a2Þ PXjA1 ;A20 ðja1;:a2Þ PXjA1 ;A20 ðj:a1;:a2Þ PXjA1 ;A20 ðj:a1;:a2Þ
x1 0 0 0.45 1 0 1
x2 0 0 0 0 0 1
x3 1 1 0 0.54 0 1
Table 4
Upper and lower conditional probabilities conditioned on IA2nfa1 ;a2g for i = 1,2.
PXjA1 ;A20 ðIfxigjIA2nfa1 ;a2gÞ ¼
1
3 PA1 jXðIfa1gjx3ÞPA2 jXðIfa2gjx3Þ
; PXjA1 ;A20 ðIfxigjIA2nfa1 ;a2gÞ ¼
1
2
PXjA1 ;A20 ðIfx3gjIA2nfa1 ;a2gÞ ¼ 0; P
XjA1 ;A2
0 ðIfx3gjIA2nfa1 ;a2gÞ ¼
1 PA1 jXðIfa1gjx3ÞPA2 jXðIfa2gjx3Þ
3 PA1 jXðIfa1gjx3ÞPA2 jXðIfa2gjx3Þ
1024 A. Benavoli, A. Antonucci / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 51 (2010) 1014–1028PXjA1 ;A20 ðjA2 n fa1; a2gÞ. In practice, the conditioning event is the complementary event of {a1,a2}, which means that at least
one doctor is unreliable.
Since IA2nfa1 ;a2g do not factorize as in (28), we cannot apply (32) to compute P
A2 jXðjxÞ. However, since PA2 jXðjxÞ is a CLP, we
can exploit the following property: PA
2 jXðIA2nfa1 ;a2gjxÞ ¼ 1 PA
2 jXðIfa1 ;a2gjxÞ ¼ 1 PA1 jXðIfa1gjxÞPA2 jXðIfa2gjxÞ and PA
2 jXðIA2nfa1 ;a2gjxÞ ¼
1 PA2 jXðIfa1 ;a2gjxÞ ¼ 1 PA1 jXðIfa1gjxÞPA2 jXðIfa2gjxÞ.
Since PA1 jXðIfa1gjxiÞPA2 jXðIfa2gjxiÞ ¼ 0 and PA1 jXðIfa1gjxiÞPA2 jXðIfa2gjxiÞ ¼ 0 for i = 1,2, and PA1 jXðIfa1gjx3ÞPA2 jXðIfa2gjx3Þ ¼ 1, the lower
and upper probabilities are those in Table 4. We can therefore note that:PXjA1 ;A20 ðIfx1gjIA2nfa1 ;a2gÞ ¼ P
XjA1 ;A2
0 ðIfx2gjIA2nfa1 ;a2gÞP P
XjA1 ;A2
0 ðIfx3gjIA2nfa1 ;a2gÞ;this means that the IFC can infer that the patient suffers from x1 or x2 but not from x3. It can be noticed that when the reli-
ability d approaches one, the lower and upper probabilities converge to the following precise probability mass function:pXjA1 ;A20 ðIfx1gjIA2nfa1 ;a2gÞ ¼ p
XjA1 ;A2
0 ðIfx2gjIA2nfa1 ;a2gÞ ¼ 1=2:Summarizing, the results of this section generalize those in [17,18] to CLPs by showing that: (i) if both the doctors are reli-
able the result obtained by the Bayes’ and Dempster’s rule in (38) is correct and coherent with the initial assessments; (ii) if
we assume that at least one of the doctors is unreliable, we obtain that the patient must suffer from either x1 or x2.
7. Application to sensor networks: the case of unknown dependence
In many applications, multiple distributed sensors are used to collect measurements about entities of interest [19]. Mea-
surements from different sensors have to be fused before useful information could be extracted. In centralized processing, all
measurements from all sensors are sent to a common fusion center taking care of the aggregation. Such an architecture
seems to be optimal, but it has practical disadvantages like high bandwidth to collect all the measurements into a single site,
high computation load, and low survivability due to a single point of failure [19]. A distributed processing architecture con-
sists instead of multiple processing agents, each responsible for collecting and processing measurements from some local
sensors. The agents communicate indeed their local estimates to other agents in order to share information. The advantages
are a reduced communication bandwidth, distribution of processing load, and improved survivability.
An important issue in distributed estimation is how to handle the dependence in the estimates to be fused. This depen-
dence may be due to common information from previous communication (e.g., some measurements may be used several
times) or hidden variables affecting the measurements. Several approaches (e.g., [19]) have been considered to perform dis-
tributed estimation, each handling dependence differently.
In order to better explain the problem let us consider a practical example, which is illustrated in Fig. 2. Node 1 transmits
its measurement ~a1 to both node 2 and node 3. These nodes fuse their measurements, respectively ~a2 and ~a3, with the re-
Fig. 2. A sensor network.
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fuses both estimates in order to obtain an aggregated estimate. As both the estimates x^ð~a1; ~a2Þ and x^ð~a1; ~a3Þ contain the same
information from node 1, they are dependent. On the other side, we assume that node 0 does not know the network archi-
tecture and, thus, it cannot know this correlation. For this reason, node 0 can be too conﬁdent about the quality of the esti-
mate (and underestimate the corresponding variance).
7.1. Bayesian case
We consider the problem in the Bayesian (i.e., precise) framework. The variables X, A1, A2 and A3 are all assumed to be real,
while for the corresponding probability distributions we have pjðajjxÞ ¼ N ðaj; x;r2mÞ, pjðxÞ ¼ N ðx; x^j;r2j Þ, and
p0ðxÞ ¼ N ðx; x^0;r20Þ, where Nð;l;r2Þ is a Gaussian distribution with mean l and variance r2.
By assuming A1, A2 and A3 conditionally independent given X, we can use the aggregation scheme of Fig. 1 to fuse node 1
and node 2, with node 2 playing the role of the IFC (and similarly proceed for node 3). Since node 1 sends the measurement
to node 2 (node 3), we can use the scheme of Fig. 1 starting from step (b). Then, we have pjðxj~a1; ~ajÞ / p1ð~a1jxÞpjð~ajjxÞpjðxÞ,
with j = 2, 3. Because of the Gaussian assumptions, it follows that pjðxj~a1; ~ajÞ ¼ N ðx; x^ð~a1; ~ajÞ;r2ð~a1; ~ajÞÞ with16 Not
three qu
require
measurx^ð~a1; ~ajÞ ¼ 13 ðx^j þ ~a1 þ ~ajÞ;
r2ð~a1; ~ajÞ ¼ 13 ;
ð40Þwhere, just for sake of simplicity, rj = rm = 1. Now we can use the aggregation scheme of Fig. 1 to combine the estimates of
nodes 2 and 3 at the level of node 0, which now plays the role of the IFC, and conclude:x^fin ¼ 15 ðx^0 þ ~a1 þ ~a1 þ ~a2 þ ~a3Þ;
r2fin ¼
1
5
:
ð41ÞSince in the scheme of Fig. 1 we assumed that sources share posteriors and priors with node 0, node 0 does not know the
value of the single measurements but it can only derive the value of their sum, i.e., ~a1j ¼ ~a1 þ ~aj with j = 2, 3. Hence, it is
not able to detect that the same measurement ~a1 is used two times in (41). Conversely, if the sources would directly share
their measurements with node 0, it would compute the true fused estimate:x^true ¼ 14 ðx^0 þ ~a1 þ ~a2 þ ~a3Þ;
r2true ¼
1
4
:
ð42ÞSummarizing, if we assume independence, a consequence of the unknown correlation at the level of node 0 is that the mea-
surement ~a1 is used two times and, thus, that r2fin 6 r2true.
16
7.2. Imprecise case
Here we show how it is possible to gain robustness by solving the fusion problem in the framework of CLPs. As discussed
in Section 3 we consider the case in which the CLP in is a convex combination of the two CLPs that we obtain by independent
natural extension and, respectively, natural extension. These two CLPs correspond to the extreme cases: (i) variables are as-
sumed to be epistemic independent; (ii) no assumption is made about the possible independence among variables. An alter-
native approach, still based on set of distributions, to gain robustness for this kind of problem is presented in [20].ice that, sharing measurements is optimal under the estimation point of view but it requires more information to be transmitted among the sources, i.e.,
antities ~a1; ~a2; ~a3 should be transmitted instead of two x^ð~a1; ~a2Þ and x^ð~a1; ~a3Þ. In large networks, reducing the information to be transmitted is a main
ment. This is one of the reasons why we have chosen the aggregation scheme of Fig. 1 in which sources share posteriors (i.e., estimates) instead of
ements.
1026 A. Benavoli, A. Antonucci / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 51 (2010) 1014–1028In our case, the CLP to be combined are the linear previsions PA12 jX and PA13 jX , where A1j = A1 + Aj. Our goal is to compute
their conditional natural extension and their independent natural extension to the space A12 A13 for each x 2 X . Actually,
since our ﬁnal goal is to apply GBR, we are only interested to compute their extensions to the gamble If~a12 ;~a13g, i.e.,
PA12 ;A13 jXINE ðIf~a12 ;~a13gjxÞ and PA12 ;A13 jXNE ðIf~a12 ;~a13gjxÞ.
Unfortunately, in the continuous case probabilities that random variables assume a particular value are zero, as we have
PA12 ;A13 ;XðIf~a12 ;~a13gÞ ¼ PA12 ;A13 ;XðIf~a12 ;~a13gÞ ¼ 0. Strictly speaking this would imply that neither GBR nor regular extension can be
used to determine the ﬁnal conditional CLP. This problem might be overcome by replacing the measurement aj with the
set Bðaj; djÞ  Aj, where fBðaj; djÞgdj2R are nested neighbourhoods of aj with positive probability and converging to {aj} as their
radius dj > 0 decreases to zero [4, Section 6.10]. Coping with these interval-valued measurements makes also sense in prac-
tice because of the ﬁnite precision of the instruments. Having these ideas in mind, we may assume aj to be in fact a repre-
sentation of B(aj,dj), and hence PA12 ;A13 ;XðIf~a12 ;~a13gÞ > 0. This allows us to apply GBR and then solve (16). For dj sufﬁciently small,
pj(ajjx) can be approximated with qðdjÞN ðaj; x;r2mÞ, where q(dj) > 0 is the Lebesgue measure of B(aj,dj), which has been as-
sumed independent of aj. See [15] for further details about this discretization.17 Under this hypothesis we can therefore eval-
uate PA12 jX and PA13 jX , which are clearly linear previsions. For linear prevision the epistemic irrelevance implies standard
stochastic independence, and for the independent natural extension we can therefore write:17 The
[15], Th
sources
standarPA12 ;A13 jXINE ðIf~a12 ;~a13gjxÞ ¼ PA12 jXðIf~a12gjxÞPA13 jXðIf~a13gjxÞ ¼ qðd2ÞN ð~a12=2; x;r2m=2Þqðd3ÞN ð~a13=2; x;r2m=2Þ
¼ qðd2ÞN ðx; x^ð~a1; ~a2Þ;r
2ð~a1; ~a2ÞÞpð~a12Þ
N ðx; x^2;r22Þ
qðd3ÞN ðx; x^ð~a1; ~a3Þ;r2ð~a1; ~a3ÞÞpð~a13Þ
N ðx; x^3;r23Þ
: ð43ÞConversely, for the natural extension, we have shown in Appendix A that:PA12 ;A13 jXNE ðIf~a12 ;~a13gjxÞ ¼ max 0; PA12 jXðIf~a12gjxÞ þ PA13 jXðIf~a13gjxÞ  1
 
¼ max 0;qðd2ÞN ð~a12=2; x;r2m=2Þ þ qðd3ÞN ð~a13=2; x;r2m=2Þ  1
 
¼ max 0;qðd2ÞN ðx; x^ð
~a1; ~a2Þ;r2ð~a1; ~a2ÞÞpð~a12Þ
N ðx; x^2;r22Þ
þ qðd3ÞN ðx; x^ð
~a1; ~a3Þ;r2ð~a1; ~a3ÞÞpð~a13Þ
N ðx; x^3;r23Þ
 1
 	
; ð44ÞPA12 ;A13 jXNE ðIf~a12 ;~a13gjxÞ ¼ min PA12 jXðIf~a12gjxÞ; PA13 jXðIf~a13gjxÞ
 
¼ min qðd2ÞN ðx; x^ð
~a1; ~a2Þ;r2ð~a1; ~a2ÞÞpð~a12Þ
N ðx; x^2;r22Þ
;qðd3ÞN ðx; x^ð
~a1; ~a3Þ;r2ð~a1; ~a3ÞÞpð~a13Þ
N ðx; x^3;r23Þ
 	
: ð45ÞLet us report some remarks.
 The lower and upper previsions in (44) and (45) coincide with the lower and upper Fréchet bounds [21].
 Since q(dj) are small numbers, we might assume q(dj) < rm, in (44) the second term in the maximization always negative.
This implies that PA12 ;A13 jXNE ðIf~a12 ;~a13gjxÞ ¼ 0.
Thus, following the procedure indicated in (14), our ﬁnal CLP is:PA12 ;A13 jXðIf~a12 ;~a13gjxÞ ¼ cPA12 ;A13 jXINE ðIf~a12 ;~a13gjxÞ þ ð1 cÞPA12 ;A13 jXNE ðIf~a12 ;~a13gjxÞ ¼ cPA12 ;A13 jXINE ðIf~a12 ;~a13gjxÞ ð46Þ
andPA12 ;A13 jXðIf~a12 ;~a13gjxÞ ¼ cPA12 ;A13 jXINE ðIf~a12 ;~a13gjxÞ þ ð1 cÞPA12 ;A13 jXNE ðIf~a12 ;~a13gjxÞ: ð47Þ
Thus, by using the results in (30)–(32), since in this case the prior CLP of node 0 is a linear prevision, i.e., 0 = 1, we obtain that
P0ðIf~a12 ;~a13gðg  lÞÞ ¼ 0 reduces to:0 ¼
Z
x2X
ðgðxÞ  lÞN ðx; x^0;r20Þ IfgðxÞlP0gPA12 ;A13 jXðIf~a12 ;~a13gjxÞ þ IfgðxÞl<0gPA12 ;A13 jXðIf~a12 ;~a13gjxÞ
 
dx
¼
Z
x2X
ðgðxÞ  lÞN ðx; x^0;r20Þ cNð~a12; x;2r2mÞN ð~a13; x;2r2mÞ

þð1 cÞIfgðxÞl<0gmin Nð~a12; x;2r2mÞ;Nð~a13; x;2r2mÞ
 
dx; ð48Þ
where we have exploited the fact thatc½IfgðxÞlP0g þ IfgðxÞl<0gPA12 ;A13 jXINE ðIf~a12 ;~a13gjxÞ ¼ cPA12 ;A13 jXINE ðIf~a12 ;~a13gjxÞ;fact that the variable X is continuous is not a problem for the subsequent derivations, as discussed at the end of Section 3. In fact, by using the results in
eorem 1 continues to hold also for continuous variables. Conversely, for X continuous the results in [15] cannot be used to prove coherence at the
level (see Section 3) for general CLPs. However, in this example, since we are dealing with linear previsions at the sources level, we can use the results of
d probability to assess coherence also at this level.
Table 5
Simulation results.
c jvj %
1 1.2 49
0.9999 2.51 85
0.999 2.56 87
0.9 2.71 89
0.3 3.47 97
0.1 3.89 98
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7.3. Simulations
Monte Carlo (MC) simulations have been performed in order to show the robustness of the proposed solution for different
values of c. As a performance metric, we have evaluated how many times in the MC simulations the true value of X was in-
cluded in the following ‘‘robust” 99% credibility region, i.e., the minimum volume region v such that PðIfx2vgj~a12; ~a13ÞP 0:99.
The simulations results for 1000 MC runs, performed w.r.t the realisations of the measurements and the variable X, are
shown in Table 5 for different values of c and for x^0 ¼ 0;r0 ¼ rm ¼ 1. In particular, Table 5 reports the average volume of the
99% credibility region, i.e., jXj, and the percentage of cases in which the true value of X is included in the credibility region for
different values of c. Notice that, for c = 1, P0ðgj~a12; ~a13Þ reduces to (41), which is taken as performance reference. From Ta-
ble 5, it can be seen that for c < 1 the proposed solution guarantees robustness without increasing too much the volume of
the credibility region.8. Conclusions and outlooks
A general aggregation framework for coherent lower previsions deﬁned on a common domain has been proposed. This is
achieved by a simultaneous model revision of beliefs associated to different sources of information. The coherence of the
aggregated beliefs is also discussed. Furthermore, in the particular case of linear-vacuous mixtures and epistemic indepen-
dence among the sources, a closed formula for the aggregated beliefs has been derived. In this context, as an example of
application of this approach, Zadeh’s paradox is treated and an explanation based on our aggregation framework is achieved.
The proposed approach, in its general form, has also been applied to a problem of estimation fusion under unknown corre-
lation for sensor networks.
As a future work, we aim to study the possibility of a recursive application of our approach. In particular, for sensor net-
works, we plan to apply the algorithm in [15] to develop a recursive rule for estimation fusion in the case of unknown cor-
relation. We also want to investigate the relationships between our approach in the case of a single source and Jeffrey’s
updating. Finally, we intend to apply our rule to practical problems of information fusion in signal and data processing
and communications.
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Appendix A. Derivation of Eq. (44)
In order to compute PA12 ;A13 jXNE ðIf~a12 ;~a13gjxÞwe can make a coarsening of the possibility spaces A12 and A13, which are reduced
to spaces of cardinality two: A01j ¼ f~a1j;:~a1jg for j = 2, 3, with :~a1j complement of ~a1j with respect to Aj. Hence, we induce
PA
0
12 ;A
0
13 jX
NE from P
A12 ;A13 jX
NE by natural extension. The coherence of P
A12 ;A13 jX
NE implies that P
A12 ;A13 jX
NE ðIf~a12 ;~a13gjxÞ ¼ P
A012 ;A
0
13 jX
NE ðIf~a12 ;~a13gjxÞ.
Let M be the set of dominating linear previsions of PA
0
12 ;A
0
13 jX
NE . Then, by deﬁnition of CLP [4, Section 2.8], it follows thatPA
0
12 ;A
0
13 jX
NE ðIf~a12 ;~a13gjxÞ ¼minP2M P
A012 ;A
0
13 jXðIf~a12 ;~a13gjxÞ;wherePA
0
12 ;A
0
13 jXðIf~a12 ;~a13gjxÞ ¼
X
i2f~a12 ;:~a12g
X
j2f~a13 ;:~a13g
If~a12 ;~a13gði; jÞpði; jÞ ¼ pð~a12; ~a13Þ
1028 A. Benavoli, A. Antonucci / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 51 (2010) 1014–1028and p() is the probability mass function associated to P(). In [22], it is shown that natural extension can be equivalently
formulated as an optimization problem (primal form) which involves distributions. By exploiting this result, it can be ver-
iﬁed that the set of linear previsions M that we obtain by applying natural extension (9) to PA12 jX and PA13 jX is equal toM¼
P
i2f~a12 ;:~a12g
P
j2f~a13 ;:~a13g
If~a12gðiÞpði; jÞ ¼ PA12 jXðIf~a12gjxÞP
i2f~a12 ;:~a12g
P
j2f~a13 ;:~a13g
If~a13gðjÞpði; jÞ ¼ PA13 jXðIf~a13gjxÞP
i2f~a12 ;:~a12g
P
j2f~a13 ;:~a13g
pði; jÞ ¼ 1
pði; jÞP 0 for i 2 f~a12;:~a12g; j 2 f~a13;:~a13g:
8>>>>><
>>>>>:Thus, M is just the set of linear previsions in A012 A013 whose marginal distributions in A012 and A013 are PA
0
12 jX ¼ PA12 jX and,
respectively, PA
0
13 jX ¼ PA13 jX . This is the minimum set of constraints which must be satisﬁed by PA
0
12 ;A
0
13 jX
NE to be coherent with
PA12 jX and PA13 jX . In fact, when no independence assumptions are made, the only requirement for coherence is that the mar-
ginal on A12 and A13 must be equal to P
A12 jX and, respectively, PA13 jX . From the above deﬁnition of M, after some algebraic
manipulation it can be derived:pð~a12; ~a13Þ ¼ PA12 jXðIf~a12gjxÞ þ PA13 jXðIf~a13gjxÞ  1þ pð:~a12;:~a13Þ:
Hence, being pð:~a12;:~a13ÞP 0, if PA12 jXðIf~a12gjxÞ þ PA13 jXðIf~a13gjxÞ  1 > 0 then PA12 jXðIf~a12gjxÞ þ PA13 jXðIf~a13gjxÞ  1 is the minimum
value of pð~a12; ~a13Þwhich satisﬁes the constraints inM. Conversely, if PA12 jXðIf~a12gjxÞ þ PA13 jXðIf~a13gjxÞ  1 6 0, the minimum va-
lue of pð~a12; ~a13Þ is clearly 0.
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